Cet article propose une sélection de bonnes feuilles du livre de 2013 The Undercommons, actuellement en voie de traduction pour une publication française en 2021. Y sont abordés les thèmes de la politique « encerclée » ( surrounded ), de la gouvernance, du planning et de la policy, de la logistique, ainsi que de ce qui fait de l’étude consacrée aux undercommons une philosophie du toucher.

This article considers the role of meritocracy in the ruling ideology of Singapore. It argues that meritocracy, far from being a system for the management of scarce resources, is in fact the imposi...

Aujourd’hui, il n’est pas possible de vivre autrement que par conspiration. Mais, aujourd’hui, il n’est pas non plus possible de vivre par complot. Pour vivre maintenant, pour créer des modes de vie, des formes de vie, nous devons chercher une conspiration sans complot, une conspiration qui soit sa propre fin, une conspiration qui soit en vue d’elle-même. Cet article déplie quelques implications de cette proposition, à travers les notions de sous-communs, d’étude, de police, de soin et de complicité.

A Black Intellectual's Odyssey describes aspects of Martin Kilson's intellectual journey in the social and institutional contexts that shaped his progression from a small African American community in a Pennsylvania milltown to his collegiate experiences at the oldest Negro college in the nation, and then to Harvard University, where he was both a student and a professor for some fifty years. Kilson's own writing is framed by pieces by three of his former Harvard undergraduate students: an introduction by Cornel West; (...) an afterword by Stefano Harney and Fred Moten. (shrink)

Tirant son titre du prochain manifeste à paraître des deux auteurs, ce bref article met en relief la complicité intellectuelle entre Stefano Harney et Fred Moten au sein de nos sensibilités contemporaines. Il suggère quelques façons de les entendre dialoguer ensemble – entre eux, avec nous, parmi nous.

Cet article plaide pour un décadrage et un recadrage nécessaires pour neutraliser certains effets pervers du terme d’ effondrement, tout en conservant ses vertus mobilisatrices. Il propose de s’appuyer sur la notion d’ undercommons (« communs d’en bas » ou « sous-communs ») avancée par Stefano Harney & Fred Moten en 2013, qui s’inspire des formes de vie et de pensée collectives cultivées au sein de la black radical tradition nord-américaine, par celles et ceux qui sont issu.es des (...) cales esclavagistes de la colonisation plantacionocène. (shrink)

The increasing corporatization of education has served to expose the university as a business—and one with a highly stratified division of labor. In _Chalk Lines_ editor Randy Martin presents twelve essays that confront current challenges facing the academic workforce in U.S. colleges and universities and demonstrate how, like chalk lines, divisions between employees may be creatively redrawn. While tracing the socioeconomic conditions that have led to the present labor situation on campuses, the contributors consider such topics as the political implications (...) of managerialism and the conceptual status of academic labor. They examine the trend toward restructuring and downsizing, the particular plight of the adjunct professor, the growing emphasis on vocational training in the classroom, and union organizing among university faculty, staff, and graduate students. Placing such issues within the context of the history of labor movements as well as governmental initiatives to train a workforce capable of competing in the global economy, _Chalk Lines_ explores how universities have attempted to remake themselves in the image of the corporate sector. Originally published as an issue of _Social Text_, this expanded volume, which includes four new essays, offers a broad view of academic labor in the United States. With its important, timely contribution to debates concerning the future of higher education, _Chalk Lines_ will interest a wide array of academics, administrators, policymakers, and others invested in the state—and fate—of academia. _ Contributors._ Stanley Aronowitz, Jan Currie, Zelda F. Gamson, Emily Hacker, Stefano Harney, Randy Martin, Bart Meyers, David Montgomery, Frederick Moten, Christopher Newfield, Gary Rhoades, Sheila Slaughter, Jeremy Smith, Vincent Tirelli, William Vaughn, Lesley Vidovich, Ira Yankwitt. (shrink)

This essay builds on various critiques of the relationship between the voice and autonomous individual subjectivity, briefly tracking the specific history through which the voice transformed into an ideal object representing the liberal subject of post-Enlightenment thought. This paper asks: what are we to make of those enfleshed voices that do not conform to the ideal voice of the self-possessed liberal subject? What are we to make of those voices that refuse the imperative of improvement that underpins social and economic (...) contractualism? How might we attend to the sonicity of those voices that refuse to individuate, possess, and accumulate? And what fugitive modes of speech might be transmitted by such un-formed and un-organized voices? Against the idealized voice of liberalism, and the gendered and racialized exclusions that this voice implies, I propose a mode of fugitive listening that allows us to open our ears to the noisy voices and modes of speech that sound outside the locus of politics proper. Indebted to the Black radical tradition, fugitive listening attends to sonic practices that refuse the given grounds of representation. I argue that fugitive listening is a practice that can be situated in what Stefano Harney and Fred Moten call ‘the undercommons’. The essay concludes by turning to gossip, figuring this noisy modality of speech as central to undercommon spaces shaped by Black performance. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHow can we deal with the apparent contradiction between the normative ideals of critical theory and the practice of the current university system? To answer this question, I consult three classical criticisms of the university system: At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the French educator Joseph Jacotot formulated a pedagogical critique of the disciplinary effects of the educational system; at the beginning of the twentieth century, German historian Franz Rosenzweig articulated an ethical critique of the hegemonic educational system’s distance (...) from life; and at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, British feminist Sara Ahmed proposed a political critique of the oppressing functions of academic institutions. Taken together, these critiques can serve as an orientation for critical intellectual practice even within the academic system. Finally, I try to describe the relation between critical theory and the university thus evolving by utilising Stefano Harney’s and Fred Moten’s concept o... (shrink)

This article turns to the theoretical and practical aspects of recent abolitionist praxis to illuminate an expanded notion of politics that is attentive to lived experience and concerns for self-preservation, on the one hand, and to state- and citizen-oriented forms of political action, on the other. The incorporation of healing justice practices and self-care within movement spaces, the mutual-aid of homecoming rituals for those bailed out of jail, the development of transformative justice processes, link what Stefano Harney and (...) Fred Moten call the fugitive sociality of these spaces as opposed to direct political action. Challenging an opposition between sociality and politics, I argue that abolitionist praxis recognizes how restorative activities and fugitive spaces are not opposed to politics but are rather important and necessary ways of stimulating and sustaining activism. By incorporating and making these practices central, I argue that contemporary abolitionist praxis challenges theorists, debating the questions of whether and how racial repair might be possible, to reconsider their notions of politics. Specifically, this repair praxis suggests the limits of both state-centered and insurgent accounts of politics, absent practices focused on survival, to “make ready” citizens and institutions for abolition democracy. (shrink)

Moving education to Zoom, Microsoft Teams, and the many alternatives during the COVID19-pandemic raised the question of pedagogical form. In a sense, pandemic education in its two-dimensionality was a frictionless, sanitized reduction of education to pure form; it offered a more efficient transfer of knowledge and was marked by a heightened means-to-an-end logic. This has made the informal, unforming and deformational activity that Stefano Harney and Fred Moten call study even more difficult, if not impossible during pandemic education. (...) In this article, we consider the pitfalls of thinking in terms of pedagogical form and the formalization of education by engaging with Emile Bojesen’s work on education as (de)formation. Via Harney and Moten, we reflect on what the concept/practice of study by way of formless formation teaches us about (pre-)pandemic education and about pedagogical forms that might be in keeping with study in post-pandemic education. (shrink)

This paper is about how moral disagreement matters for metaethics. It has four parts. In the first part I argue that moral facts are subject to a certain epistemic accessibility requirement. Namely, moral facts must be accessible to some possible agent. In the second part I show that because this accessibility requirement on moral facts holds, there is a route from facts about the moral disagreements of agents in idealized conditions to conclusions about what moral facts there are. In the (...) third part I build on this route to show that (*) if there is significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, then our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and we should accept relativism over non-naturalism and quasi-realism. So, if, like many, you think that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions, you should hold that our understanding of morality is fatally flawed and reject non-naturalism and quasi-realism. In the fourth part of this paper I show that (*) undermines the plausibility of non-naturalism, quasi-realism, and the view that our understanding of morality is not fatally flawed even if we do not have sufficient reason to believe that there would be significant moral disagreement in idealized conditions. (shrink)

Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic is the 3-valued logic with two designated values defined through the weak Kleene tables. This paper is a first attempt to investigate PWK within the perspective and methods of abstract algebraic logic. We give a Hilbert-style system for PWK and prove a normal form theorem. We examine some algebraic structures for PWK, called involutive bisemilattices, showing that they are distributive as bisemilattices and that they form a variety, \, generated by the 3-element algebra WK; we also (...) prove that every involutive bisemilattice is representable as the Płonka sum over a direct system of Boolean algebras. We then study PWK from the viewpoint of AAL. We show that \ is not the equivalent algebraic semantics of any algebraisable logic and that PWK is neither protoalgebraic nor selfextensional, not assertional, but it is truth-equational. We fully characterise the deductive filters of PWK on members of \ and the reduced matrix models of PWK. Finally, we investigate PWK with the methods of second-order AAL—we describe the class \ of PWK-algebras, algebra reducts of basic full generalised matrix models of PWK, showing that they coincide with the quasivariety generated by WK—which differs from \—and explicitly providing a quasiequational basis for it. (shrink)

In this paper I defend what I call the argument from epistemic reasons against the moral error theory. I argue that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief and that this is bad news for the moral error theory since, if there are no epistemic reasons for belief, no one knows anything. If no one knows anything, then no one knows that there is thought when they are thinking, and no one knows that they (...) do not know everything. And it could not be the case that we do not know that there is thought when we believe that there is thought and that we do not know that we do not know everything. I address several objections to the claim that the moral error theory entails that there are no epistemic reasons for belief. It might seem that arguing against the error theory on the grounds that it entails that no one knows anything is just providing a Moorean argument against the moral error theory. I show that even if my argument against the error theory is indeed a Moorean one, it avoids Streumer's, McPherson's and Olson's objections to previous Moorean arguments against the error theory and is a more powerful argument against the error theory than Moore's argument against external world skepticism is against external world skepticism. (shrink)

Recently, it has been argued that the use of Big Data transforms the sciences, making data-driven research possible and studying causality redundant. In this paper, I focus on the claim on causal knowledge by examining the Big Data project EXPOsOMICS, whose research is funded by the European Commission and considered capable of improving our understanding of the relation between exposure and disease. While EXPOsOMICS may seem the perfect exemplification of the data-driven view, I show how causal knowledge is necessary for (...) the project, both as a source for handling complexity and as an output for meeting the project’s goals. Consequently, I argue that data-driven claims about causality are fundamentally flawed and causal knowledge should be considered a necessary aspect of Big Data science. In addition, I present the consequences of this result on other data-driven claims, concerning the role of theoretical considerations. I argue that the importance of causal knowledge and other kinds of theoretical engagement in EXPOsOMICS undermine theory-free accounts and suggest alternative ways of framing science based on Big Data. (shrink)

Some standards, such as moral and prudential standards, provide genuinely or authoritatively normative reasons for action. Other standards, such as the norms of masculinity and the mafia’s code of omerta, provide reasons but do not provide genuinely normative reasons for action. This paper first explains that there is a similar distinction amongst attitudinal standards: some attitudes (belief, desire) have standards that seem to give rise to genuine normativity; others (boredom, envy) do not. This paper gives a value-based account of which (...) attitudinal standards give rise to genuine normativity. It argues that this account has interesting implications before extending it to provide an account of which action-guiding standards are genuinely normative. It argues that this value-based account of which standards are genuinely normative is more plausible than alternatives suggested in the literature and has interesting implications for genuine normativity in law and aesthetics. (shrink)

Kant's Notion of "Transcendental Truth". [English] The aim of this work is to elucidate the notion of “transcendental truth” and to show its role in the Kantian system. I will argue that this notion is in line with the traditional definition of truth, i.e., that it consists in the correspondence between knowledge and object. I will also argue that criteria of transcendental truth are provided by transcendental logic, and that it is this notion of truth what makes it possible to (...) establish the truth of a priori knowledge and delimitate the field of empirical truth. [Español] El objetivo de este trabajo es dilucidar la noción de “verdad trascendental” y mostrar su lugar en el sistema kantiano. Se defenderá que la verdad trascendental consiste, en línea con la definición tradicional de verdad, en un sentido de correspondencia entre conocimiento y objeto, que la lógica trascendental establece criterios de verdad trascendental, y que es esta noción de verdad la que permite establecer la verdad del conocimiento a priori y delimitar el territorio de la verdad empírica. (shrink)

I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I argue that we have strong reason to (...) accept RP because we can explain a correlation between reasons for prefer- ences and other reasons only if we accept RP. I argue that no objections undermine RP and that RP has interesting implications for the reasons for attitudes there are and for reasons fundamentalism. (shrink)

Gender-affirming healthcare interventions are medical or surgical interventions that aim to allow trans and non-binary people to better affirm their gender identity. It has been argued that rights to GAH must be grounded in either a right to be cured of or mitigate an illness—gender dysphoria—or in harm prevention, given the high rates of depression and suicide among trans and non-binary people. However, these grounds of a right to GAH conflict with the prevalent view among theorists, institutions and activists that (...) trans and non-binary people do not have a mental illness and that one can be trans and entitled to GAH without being depressed or suicidal. This paper challenges the orthodoxy that a right to GAH must be grounded in either of these ways and instead argues for a right to GAH grounded in a right to live and act with integrity. The standard view, which this paper explains, is that our rights to live and act with integrity ground a right to religious accommodation in many cases such as a right to not be denied social security due to one’s refusal to work a job on a holy day. This paper argues that if our rights to live and act with integrity can ground prima facie rights to religious accommodation, our rights to live and act with integrity ground prima facie rights to GAH. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

This article responds to recent empirical studies by De Brigard and Weijers on intuitions about Nozick's experience machine thought experiment. It argues that, contra De Brigard and Weijers, our intuitions about the experience machine do undermine hedonism about well-being and what's good for us. It furthers this argument by conducting new empirical studies into our intuitions about the experience machine.

Many have argued that various features of moral disagreements create problems for cognitivism about moral judgment, but these arguments have been shown to fail. In this paper, I articulate a new problem for cognitivism that derives from features of our responses to moral disagreement. I argue that cognitivism entails that one of the following two claims is false: (1) a mental state is a belief only if it tracks changes in perceived evidence; (2) it is intelligible to make moral judgments (...) that do not track changes in perceived evidence. I explain that there is a good case that (1) holds such that we should prefer theories that do not entail the negation of (1). And I argue that the seeming intelligibility of entirely intransigent responses to peer disagreement about moral issues shows us that there is a good case that (2) holds. (shrink)

According to the ICD-11 and DSM-5, transgender people’s experienced gender is incongruent with their natal sex or gender and the purpose of gender affirming-healthcare (GAH) interventions is to reduce this incongruence. Vincent argues that this view is conceptually incoherent—the incoherence thesis—and proposes that the ICD and DSM should be revised to understand transgender people as experiencing a merely felt incongruence between their gender and their natal sex or gender—the feelings revision. I argue that (i) Vincent in fact gives us no (...) reason to believe the incoherence thesis and that (ii) we may want to resist the combination of the incoherence thesis and the feelings revision because this combination seems to imply that all transgender people have feelings that are misplaced and are, in an importance sense, incorrect or mistaken. I then give a fit-based account of how trans people’s experienced gender can be incongruent with their natal sex or gender and how GAH can reduce this incongruence. (shrink)

Liberating Content By CappelenHerman and LeporeErnieOxford University Press, 2015. vi + 304 pp. £45.00.

The new concerns facing aestheticians in the twenty-first century require serious attention if the discipline is to maintain continued viability as an intellectual discipline. Just as art changes as cultures develop, so must aesthetics. In support of this view is a personal account of evolving engagement with aesthetics and the factors that led to embracing change and a plurality of practices as essential to the health of aesthetic today. A brief examination of the state of aesthetics as it has evolved (...) in the American Society for Aesthetics since its inception in the 1940s will follow. These two lines of development, one idiosyncratic and personal, and the other focusing on the aims and outcomes of one prominent national society, will perhaps offer some useful background for understanding the current state of aesthetics and the problems confronting the discipline today. Following these considerations will be a look at some of the main concerns reflected in the social and political aesthetics and the expansion of aesthetics to include the popular arts which again challenges aesthetics to move beyond its historic boundaries. (shrink)

In treating religious pluralism, Anglophone philosophical literature often turns to markedly general investigations—“meta-issues”—which by their generality minimize empirical content. On the other hand, more conservative Christian philosophers often do appeal to markedly empirical groundings for inquiry, particularly in the Bible. However, in this essay, I conclude that prominent evangelical Christian treatments of religious pluralism—because of their lack of attention to the extrabiblical data of non-Christian religions themselves—often risk being significantly irrelevant or inaccurate, or unclear in representing other religions. I further (...) propose that excessive attention to philosophical “meta-issues” or neglect of the empirical details of particular religions threatens to obscure or to cause the overlooking of important data, such as significant continuities between prima facie very different traditions. As a corrective to such neglect, I undertake an evidentialist evaluation of religious pluralism, focusing especially on significant similarities and differences between Christianity and Pure Land Buddhism. This trajectory leads me to end with the question: if the doctrines of two or more religions are sufficiently similar to be mutually translatable, and if one of these religions issues true or soteriologically effective claims, then do its corresponding analogates similarly designate truth or promote soteriological efficacy, and if so, to what extent? (shrink)

Memory is modified through the act of retrieval. Although retrieving a target piece of information may strengthen the retrieved information itself, it may also serve to weaken retention of related information. This phenomenon, termed retrieval-induced forgetting, has garnered substantial interest for its implications as to why forgetting occurs. The present study attempted to replicate the seminal work by Anderson, Bjork, and Bjork (1994) on retrieval-induced forgetting, given the apparent sensitivity of the effect to certain deviations from the original paradigm developed (...) to study the phenomenon. The study extends the conditions under which retrieval-induced forgetting has been examined by utilizing both a traditional college undergraduate sample (Experiment 1), along with a more diverse internet sample (Experiment 2). In addition, Experiment 3 details a replication attempt of retrieval-induced forgetting using Anderson and Spellman’s (1995) independent cue procedure. Retrieval-induced forgetting was observed when using the traditional retrieval practice paradigm with undergraduate (Experiment 1) and internet (Experiment 2) samples, though the effect was not found when using the independent cue procedure (Experiment 3). Thus, the study can provide an indication as to the robustness of retrieval-induced forgetting to deviations from the traditional college undergraduate samples that have been used in the majority of existing research on the effect. (shrink)

In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that the wrong kind of (...) reasons for pro-attitudes are reasons that would not still be reasons for pro-attitudes if it were not for the additional consequences of having those pro-attitudes. (shrink)

The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may (...) be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning – a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action. (shrink)

This paper aims to articulate the nexus of judgement and authority in the public use of reason: in the context, i.e., of the limits and conditions of possibility of public reason. It is an area characterized by a traditional alternative of judgement and authority: an alternative that largely coincides with a kind of «public excommunication» of authority, ie the recognition of the reason as the only acceptable form of argument of authority. This model knows, however, a profound crisis of plausibility: (...) it is a crisis that favors the emergence of forms of authority at high risk of authoritarian perversion. The thesis is that, to return authority to the public reason, some presuppositions need to recognize inescapable. These presuppositions are related to the dimensions of space and time as shared: as “public space” and “public time”. (shrink)

This article adopts a transmedial perspective in order to investigate narrative similarities and differences between print and online travel writing. Texts, which are contemporary and Western-authored, are written either in English, French and Italian and they all focus on China as the travel destination. Drawing upon Gérard Genette and Mieke Bal's studies on the narrative discourse, it is contended that travel books and travel blogs, despite sharing basic generic features, present substantial differences. In the former, readers are presented with a (...) coherent and self-exhaustive narrative. This means that the representation of both China and the traveller results as a progressive discovery. On the other hand, travel blogs provide fragmented and objectified accounts rich in touristic tips. As a consequence, the narrative loses its internal development and takes on an informative value in which the portrayal of China and the traveller recede to the background. (shrink)